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NOTES
HARMONIZING U.S. SECURITIES AND
FUTURES REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has authority over
U.S. securities1 markets, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) has authority over U.S. futures2 markets.3 When the regulatory
scheme for these markets first coalesced in the 1930s, there was a clear
distinction between the instruments being traded on the two. Today,
however, the boundary between securities and commodities is far more
ambiguous. Traditional securities and commodities still exist, but a vast,
complex array of instruments that are both futures and securities developed
during and after the latter half of the 20th century. Futures on financial
instruments now account for the vast majority of trading volume on futures
markets.4
As a result of this evolution, the bifurcated scheme distinguishing
securities from futures is outdated and should be overhauled. This note
addresses the need for U.S. financial regulators to reform the system
currently governing securities and futures, and asserts that the functions of
the SEC and the CFTC should be merged into a single market regulator
with uniform rules.
Part II of this note briefly recounts the development of the current
system, and summarizes prior movements towards a unified regulatory
agency. Part III explores the short-comings of the current approach towards
regulation by detailing its disadvantages in the marketplace. Part IV
analyzes several key areas where genuine reform of the underlying
regulations is necessary, and proposes some solutions for a harmonized
regulatory regime. Part V concludes this note by summarizing the
importance of these issues.

1. Securities include stocks, bonds, notes, treasury stocks, debentures, and a wide variety of
other instruments. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (2006).
2. “Futures are agreements that obligate the holder to buy or sell a specific amount or value
of an underlying asset, reference rate, or index at a specified price on a specified date. These
contracts may be satisfied by delivery or by offset with another contract.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTION ACCORD 1 n.2 (2000).
3. Id. at 5.
4. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK J. INT’L
L. 319, 361 (2003).
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II. A SHORT HISTORY
The bifurcated regulatory system of U.S. markets, known colloquially
as “functional” regulation,5 owes its evolution to little more than the
accidents of history. While the practice of futures trading traces its lineage
back to the twelfth century, the regulatory history relevant to this note only
goes back to Midwestern farmers who sought to hedge the risk of planting
their crops around the turn of the twentieth century. The practice of
securities trading has an equally lengthy pedigree, but similarly, this note
focuses only on the modern regulatory environment, which has emerged
since the Great Depression. Although both regimes developed upon
separate but parallel tracks for the better part of half a century, there have
been genuine, if unsuccessful, efforts in recent years to bridge the
regulatory gap and combine the CFTC and SEC.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 19746 created the
CFTC as a response to commodity price inflation and several scandals in
the trading of unregulated commodity options during the early 1970s.7 That
legislation updated and modernized the earlier Commodity Exchange Act of
1936,8 which had proven ineffective at stopping the price manipulation it
was created to combat.9 The 1974 Act gave the CFTC “exclusive
jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or
executed on a contract market.”10 That broad grant of authority eventually
led to a series of disputes regarding the boundary between the CFTC and
the SEC.11 The now infamous Shad-Johnson Accords,12 later codified into
law,13 addressed some of those conflicts, as did the Commodity Futures
Trading Modernization Act of 2000.14
The SEC was created in 193415 to enforce the provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933,16 as well as several other important financial
regulations.17 These pieces of legislation were a direct response to the
5. Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass Steagall Reform, 2 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 89, 90 (1995).
6. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(1974).
7. Markham, supra note 4, at 341.
8. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
9. Markham, supra note 4, at 340–41.
10. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)1(a) (2000).
11. E.g., Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982).
12. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2.
13. An Act to Clarify the Jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Definition of Security, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 97–303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982); Futures
Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
14. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d.
16. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa).
17. See Markham, supra note 4, at 326 n.34.
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Senate Banking Committee’s investigation into the stock market crash of
1929,18 and the subsequent emphasis placed on securities regulation by
President Franklin Roosevelt.19 Roosevelt was particularly concerned with
the principle of full disclosure,20 which has since become the cornerstone of
modern securities regulation.21 The SEC operates in tandem with a bevy of
other actors to form a complex, multi-layered regulatory framework that
includes non-governmental self-regulatory organizations (SROs), state
attorneys general, and the various accounting firms and ratings agencies
whose approval is necessary for listing on the exchanges.22
Despite their divergent histories and different functions, the recent past
has seen at least one attempt to merge the two agencies in the form of the
Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act,23 which was
introduced and defeated in the House of Representatives by Representative
Wyden in 1995 amidst lukewarm support from both agencies.24 The bill
would have ceded the functions of both the SEC25 and CFTC26 to a newly
established Markets and Trading Commission,27 and created an overarching Federal Financial Markets Coordinating Council,28 composed of the
heads of the Department of Treasury, Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
Markets and Trading Commission, and other financial regulatory bodies.29
While the act was intended to bring some clarity and coordination to
financial regulation,30 with the exception of the ability to change margin
requirements31 it gave the Markets and Trading Commission no authority to
resolve any of the underlying regulatory conflicts that gave rise to the need
for clarity and coordination in the first place.32 In the end, it was little more
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 13 (1982).
Id. at 51–53.
“Let in the light!” Id. at 20, 40.
Id.
See Markham, supra note 4, at 325–38 (fully discussing the relations among these actors).
Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act, H.R. 718, 104th Cong. (1995).
Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 718 Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on
Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC).
25. H.R. 718 § 202.
26. H.R. 718 § 201.
27. H.R. 718 § 101.
28. H.R. 718 § 301.
29. H.R. 718 § 301(b).
30. “The purposes of this act are . . . to establish a single federal regulatory body . . . to
coordinate the regulation of all financial markets . . . and . . . to ensure the competitiveness of
those markets.” H.R. 718 § 2.
31. H.R. 718 § 203.
32. H.R. 718 § 411.
[T]he Commission . . . may exercise any authority available by law . . . with respect to
such function to the official or agency from which such function is transferred, and the
actions of the Commission in exercising such authority shall have the same force and
effect as when exercised by such official or agency.
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than a glorified reshuffling of the existing bureaucracy33 and its failure to
address the underlying regulatory issues was considered a significant flaw.34
The issue has been raised again, however, as legislators continue to be
frustrated by the inefficiencies of the bifurcated system.35 There is concern
that an outright merger of the SEC and CFTC is “probably a bridge too
far,”36 but it has not swayed industry advocates from pressing for
comprehensive reform.37 The consensus amongst Congress and the
securities and commodities industries appears to be that the rules need to be
harmonized, which would accomplish in substance what the Markets and
Trading Reorganization and Reform Act attempted to do in form.
III. DUELING AGENCIES HELP NO ONE
Bifurcation of the regulatory system was once a common-sense,
efficient method of oversight because of the clear distinction between the
products traded on securities markets versus those traded on futures
markets.38 Recent innovations have significantly blurred the lines between
the two areas, however, and created considerable regulatory uncertainty
among investors, regulators, and financial institutions. Some professionals
even attest that this uncertainty has been detrimental to the formation of
new products on the markets.39 The costs and uncertainty that have befallen
those who did attempt to innovate, such as the Chicago Board of Trade,40
provide a concrete example of the burdensome ordeal that awaits any
product that cuts across the clear regulatory distinctions the two agencies
prefer to maintain. These regulatory hurdles are even seen by some as a
reason for the decline in U.S. competitiveness in relation to other financial
markets around the world.41 Although they may not speak directly to the
problem, recent attempts by SROs to reduce overlapping regulations by
harmonizing their rules and combining their enforcement functions is a

Id.

33. See generally H.R. 718 §§ 412–13 (giving the Commission the power to delegate tasks and
reorganize the various administrative entities within the existing bureaucracy).
34. Financial Market Regulation: Benefits and Risks of Merging the SEC and CFTC: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and GSEs of the H. Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services, 104th Cong. 6 (1995) (statement of James Bothwell, Director, Financial
Institutions and Markets Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) [hereinafter Bothwell Testimony].
35. Study Sought on Blending SEC, CFTC, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, July 12, 2007, http://fa–
mag.com/news.php?id_content=4&idNews=1021.
36. Id. (quoting Sen. Jack Reed).
37. Gary DeWaal, America Must Create a Single Financial Regulator, FIN. TIMES, May 19,
2005, at 13.
38. Markham, supra note 4, at 346.
39. See DeWaal, supra note 37.
40. See infra note 45.
41. See generally MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 78–85 (2007).
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clear indicator that the markets are over-burdened by excessive, and
sometimes contradictory, regulations.42
Regulatory confusion with regard to many emerging instruments stems
from the hap-hazard division of authority between the two agencies. The
CFTC was broadly given “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to
accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract
market . . . or derivatives transaction execution facility registered pursuant
to”43 the Act. Unfortunately, this grant of power would have easily
encompassed many securities products (such as puts and calls on individual
stocks) in the absence of vague limitations intended to carve out a niche for
the SEC.44 Despite the fact that various instruments that were both
securities and futures existed at the time these regulations were first
promulgated, Congress failed to make any clear distinction between the
authorities of the two agencies to regulate them.45
The most famous dispute generated by this ambiguous bifurcation was
the battle between the SEC and the CFTC in Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago v. SEC.46 There, the Board of Trade (with support from the CFTC)
challenged the approval given to the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) by the SEC to create a market for exchange-formed off-set options
in government national mortgage associations (GNMAs, also known as
Ginnie Maes), arguing that only the CFTC had the authority to give such
permission.47 The dispute coalesced because, at the time, the CFTC had
banned the trading of options on exchanges it governed, which included the
Board of Trade but not the CBOE, which was governed by the SEC.48 The
court noted that the options in question were technically both “securities”
and “commodities,”49 but concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction given to
the CFTC to regulate commodities trumped any potential jurisdictional
42. Gaston F. Ceron, Moving the Market: NASD, NYSE Regulatory Arm Plan Oversight Entity,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at C3.
43. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2007).
44. The carve-out appears intentionally broad, claiming that “nothing contained in this section
shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange
Commission.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(A); accord 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(C).
This chapter shall not apply to and the Commission shall have no jurisdiction to
designate a board of trade as a contract market for any transaction whereby any party to
such transaction acquires any put, call, or other option on one or more
securities . . . including any group or index of such securities, or any interesting therein
or based on the value thereof.
Id.

45. See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1148 (7th Cir. 1982); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the significance of the case).
46. 677 F.2d at 1148.
47. Id. at 1140–41.
48. Id. at 1143–45.
49. Id. at 1142 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) and 7 U.S.C.A. § 2).
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claim by the SEC based on a finding that “GNMA’s are not traditional
stocks and GNMA options have the character of a legitimate commodity
derivative.”50
Although the case was deemed moot on appeal when the two agencies
reached an informal agreement to share authority in the Shad-Johnson
Accord,51 the fundamental conflict remains. A bifurcated regulatory system,
designed for the distinctly different markets of the 1930s, is ill-equipped to
handle the needs and challenges of increasingly complex and intertwined
markets in the twenty-first century. Even if costly disagreements over new
products could be avoided, there is still concern that bifurcation ignores the
linkages between the two markets to the detriment of the economy, leading
to events like the stock market crash of 1987.52
There is also some indication that the United States is losing ground to
other financial centers, like London, because of the burdens of bifurcated
regulation. Much of the criticism in this area is directed at the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 200253 and the burdens it placed on public equity offerings,
particularly as evidenced by the sharp reduction in U.S. initial public
offerings (IPOs) in recent years.54 However, there have also been
suggestions that those problems have combined with the rise in derivatives
trading over the past few years to make markets with unified regulatory
schemes, like London, much more attractive centers of investment.55 Using
the example of a common hedge fund in a recent Financial Times op-ed,
one commentator argued for unified regulation by noting that when
“trad[ing] both equities and futures, its positions are monitored under
separate regulatory environments subject to different rules” in the United
States, as compared to the United Kingdom, where “a hedge fund can
maintain both . . . positions in one regulatory environment.”56
Although it does not speak directly to the issue at hand, the recent
decision by the NYSE and the NASD to “consolidate their member
regulation operations”57 under a uniform banner is a sure signal from the
private sector that the financial markets are over-regulated. Indeed,
combating over-regulation was one of the major motivators of the merger.58
NASD Chairman Mary Schapiro noted that one of the plan’s aims was to
50. Id. at 1152.
51. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 6.
52. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE

ON MARKET MECHANISMS
(1988) (popularly known as “The Brady Commission Report”) [hereinafter BRADY COMMISSION
REPORT].
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 805 (2002).
54. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 2 (2006).
55. DeWaal, supra note 37.
56. Id.
57. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD and NYSE Group Announce Plan to
Consolidate Regulation of Securities Firms (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2006NewsReleases/P017973.
58. Id.
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effectuate “a more sensible and less complex regulatory regime that makes
private sector regulation more efficient and effective.”59 SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox echoed her comments, citing efforts toward “eliminating
overlapping regulation, establishing a uniform set of rules, and placing
oversight responsibility in a single organization” as key strengths of the
merger.60 These advantages are nearly identical to some of those advocated
nearly twenty years ago by the then Commissioner of the SEC when
speaking of the potential for merging that organization with the CFTC.61
IV. REFORM OF THE UNDERLYING REGULATIONS
Although the notion of merging the SEC and CFTC is not necessarily
new, prior proposals have envisioned a bureaucratic reshuffling that would
coordinate their enforcement activities, but leave in place the bifurcation of
the underlying securities and futures regulations.62 While this might
technically eliminate some much-lamented jurisdictional battles, it would
not bring any uniformity to the marketplace, and would “continue to require
teams of investigators and attorneys with specialized expertise in both
futures and securities laws and markets regardless of whether they are
housed in one or two agencies.”63 Despite the small advantages such a
reshuffling might provide, investors looking to trade in futures and
securities would continue to maintain separate accounts, typically overseen
by separate advisors, subject to separate regulatory regimes. Genuine
reforms that would allow investors to maintain one account, with one
advisor, and subject to only one regulatory regime, can only be achieved by
harmonizing futures and securities regulations. Although there are
numerous points of conflict, priority should be placed on harmonizing the
areas of margin requirements, suitability rules, account protections, insider
trading, and broker-dealer and futures commission merchant (FCM)
registration.
A. MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
Authority over securities margin requirements is officially delegated to
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, with an eye towards
“preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchasing or carrying of
securities.”64 The Board of Governors has issued margin requirements and

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Mary L. Schapiro, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the Law and Compliance Division of
the Futures Industry Association (May 3, 1990). This is surely not a coincidence, as the
Commissioner at that time was the same Mary Schapiro who now heads the NASD.
62. See supra Part II.
63. Bothwell Testimony, supra note 34, at 3.
64. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(a) (2006).
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related rules pursuant to Regulation T,65 requiring a margin of anywhere
from 50% to 150% of the value of the securities involved in the
transaction66 to be deposited within five business days of its execution.67
“The primary purpose of the margin requirements was to provide the Board
with an effective method of reducing the amount of the Nation’s credit
resources which could be directed by speculation into the stock market.”68
The margin requirements are thus quite high, as “it is the public policy of
the United States . . . to discourage and prevent the purchase of stock on
extended credit.”69 By contrast, authority over futures margin requirements
is delegated to the contract markets themselves,70 or to self-regulating
registered futures associations,71 such as the National Futures Association
(NFA).72 Although margin levels vary slightly by exchange, and even by
commodity, they are typically about 5% of the value of the underlying
futures contract.73
These vastly different margin requirements appear to be the result of the
different roles played by margin in the securities and futures industries. In
case of the former, it is considered a down payment on the purchase of an
asset, while in the latter case it is considered a performance bond on the
obligations set out in the underlying contract.74 In addition, the higher
65. 12 C.F.R. § 220.1 (2008).
66. 12 C.F.R. §220.12(a)–(f). But see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(c)(2)(B) (allowing the SEC and
CFTC to jointly regulate margin requirements for securities–futures products and comparable
options contracts authorized by 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(a)).
67. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(3)(i). But see 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(3)(ii) (allowing extension of the
payment period in five–day increments upon application to the applicable governing exchange or
SRO).
68. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F.Supp. 453, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Stonehill v. Sec. Nat’l Bank,
68 F.R.D. 24, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The “main purpose” of the margin rules was to regulate the volume of credit flowing
into the securities market: “The main purpose is to give a Government credit agency an
effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation’s credit resources
which can be directed by speculation into the stock market and out of other more
desirable uses of commerce and industry—to prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash
situation where funds which would otherwise have been available at normal interest
rates for uses of local commerce, industry and agriculture, were drained by far higher
rates into security loans and the New York call market.”
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934)); accord 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(a)
(2006) (“For the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of
securities . . . .”).
69. Klein v. D.R. Comenzo Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1960).
70. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7(d)(11) (2007) (“financial integrity of contracts”).
71. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-2(b) (“delegation of functions under core principles”).
72. The NFA is the largest of such self–regulating associations, however its margin authority
is in turn delegated to its member contract markets. See National Futures Association Manual ¶
7007 (1999), http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualFinancial.asp#fins7.
73. NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, OPPORTUNITY AND RISK: AN EDUCATION GUIDE 27 (2006),
available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/investor/OppRisk/OppRisk.pdf.
74. Dana Atwood Lukens, Note, Regulation for the Securities Markets?, 10 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 379, 413 (1991).
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requirements in securities markets are thought to help curb volatility,75 a
condition the futures markets are not preoccupied with limiting.76
The sheer magnitude of the discrepancy between the two margin levels
might be difficult to reconcile, but it is not impossible. Securities-futures
products, for example, are already subject to identical margin requirements
regardless of whether they are traded on securities or futures exchanges.77
Moreover, in the wake of the 1987 Crash, margin harmonization was
suggested as an efficient way to prevent another meltdown.78
The issue, therefore, is whether harmonized margins should be closer to
the current futures or securities level. Recent scholarship that calls into
question the classic assumption that higher margin requirements are an
effective method of reducing stock market volatility may offer a partial
answer.79 There is significant evidence that volatility in the markets leads to
changes in margin requirements, in direct contrast to the conventional
wisdom that the relationship operates in the other direction.80 As a result,
one of the justifications for keeping securities margins so high is no longer
as convincing as it once was.81
On the other hand, lower rates do tend to result in greater credit
allocation to securities and futures speculation.82 Although preventing this
was the major concern of Congress when it originally enacted securities
margin requirements, the overall percentage of the nation’s credit that is
directed towards securities speculation is so low that it ceases to be a
credible concern.83 Consequently, and in light of the fact that higher
requirements tend to decrease the liquidity that futures markets need to

75. Id.
76. Markham, supra note 4, at 363 (“Futures are not needed for commodities with stable
prices. Such commodities do not need the benefits of hedging, and speculators are uninterested
because there is no profit to be made from a stable price.”). But see 7 U.S.C.A. §6a(a) (“Sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of . . . [commodities are] an undue
and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce.”).
77. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(C)(v)(IV).
It shall be unlawful for any futures commission merchant to, directly or indirectly,
extend or maintain credit to or for, or collect margin from any customer on any security
futures product unless such activities comply with the regulations prescribed pursuant
to section 7(c)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id.

78. BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at vii.
79. PAUL H. KUPIEC, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MARGIN
REQUIREMENTS, VOLATILITY, AND MARKET INTEGRITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED SINCE THE
CRASH? 8 (1997).
80. Id. at 29–31.
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
82. KUPIEC, supra note 79, at 32.
83. Robert J. Malloy, Margin Regulation: The Stock Market Crash of 1987, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
693, 701 (1989) (noting that Federal Reserve studies indicate less than 3% of the nation’s credit is
allocated towards securities speculation).
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function properly,84 a harmonized margin requirement settled at a rate
closer to the lower rates currently seen in futures markets seems more
appropriate.85

B. THE SUITABILITY REQUIREMENT
Another key distinction between the two regulatory schemes is the socalled “suitability requirement” of the securities industry, whereby brokerdealers have a fiduciary duty not to recommend unsuitable investments to
their customers when dispensing investment advice.86 While federal
securities laws do not explicitly impose such a duty, securities SROs have
promulgated rules to this effect pursuant to the SEC’s anti-fraud rule, 10b5.87 The federal courts and the SEC have likewise found and enforced a
suitability requirement under Rule 10b-5.88 The basic premise of the rule is
that when broker-dealers stand in a position of trust and confidence to their
clients and make recommendations,89 if they know that any of those

84. KUPIEC, supra note 79, at 5–6 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve Bank, the CFTC, and
the Treasury department share concerns over the negative effect that increased margin
requirements would have on futures market liquidity).
85. Id. at 5 (noting that the Brady Commission, in the wake of the 1987 Crash, suggested that
harmonization would be helpful, but refused to recommend increasing futures margins to match
securities margins—implying that a lowering of securities margins was perhaps more
appropriate).
86. There is considerable scholarly debate surrounding the precise theory of liability upon
which the “suitability requirement” rests. The full range of that discussion is far beyond the scope
of this note, however, and it is sufficient for these purposes that the doctrine itself is universally
accepted.
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to: (a) employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) engage in any act,
practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Id.; see NASD Rule 2310 (“broker-dealer must have reasonable basis for believing that a
recommendation is suitable for a customer, given the information known or provided by the
customer”).
88. Olde Discount Corp., 67 SEC Docket 2045, 1998 WL 575171, at *20–21 (1998); City of
San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. 84-20601, 1991 WL 352485, at *1–2 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that mere negligence is insufficient to
sustain a cause of action under 10b-5, but that such an action requires an intent to deceive).
89. Courts are divided over whether or not a customer must have a discretionary account,
where the broker-dealer is responsible for buying and selling on behalf of the client, in order to
trigger the suitability requirement. Typically it will be enough to assert that a broker-dealer was
held in trust and confidence by the client, and that his recommendations were followed as a result
of that relationship. For a fuller discussion of this debate, see Baker v. Wheat First Sec., 643
F.Supp. 1420, 1428–29 (S.D. W.Va. 1986).
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recommendations is unsuitable they must inform their client.90 In order to
facilitate that determination, SEC rules require the collection of information
from each individual customer regarding income, net worth, investment
objectives, and employment status.91 Violation of this requirement, like all
10b-5 fraud violations, can result in a private action and civil liability.92
Despite the similarity between the anti-fraud provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act and those of the Securities Exchange Act,93
however, courts and the CFTC have held that “no rule of suitability governs
the commodity broker-customer relationship under the Commodity
Exchange Act or under the regulations adopted by the CFTC.”94 The CFTC
did attempt to institute a formal suitability requirement in the late 1970s,
but it was defeated, perhaps by industry pressures, in favor of a far more
modest risk-disclosure requirement.95 Its official position was that it was
“unable . . . to formulate meaningful standards of universal application.”96
Although the NFA has adopted a “know your customer” rule,97 it is
considered a business-conduct standard rather than an anti-fraud rule and
creates no private right of action,98 in contrast to the 10b-5-based securities
rules. The rule requires information-gathering from customers only so that
the FCM will know what level of risk disclosure is appropriate for each
customer, but it emphasizes that it is for the customer to decide whether any
particular trade is suitable.99 This focus is intended to absolve FCMs of a
90. Clark, 583 F.2d at 600; accord Rolf v. Blyth, Eastmon Dillan & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44–48
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the suitability requirement is violated when a broker–dealer who has a
duty to his client is reckless in his recommendations).
91. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(17)(i)(A) (2007).
92. Kardon v. Nat’ Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
93. Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. CV-82-6701, 1985 WL 28,
at *14 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“Because § 4(b)(A) is the commodities counterpart of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the elements of a claim under § 4(b)(A) are basically the same as those under Rule 10b5.”).
94. Id. at 15; accord Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. R80-385-80-704, 1986 WL
68447, at *8–9 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 5, 1986).
95. Markham, supra note 4, at 355.
96. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, at 31,888 (July 24, 1978).
97. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Rule 2–30, Customer Information and Disclosure, available at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualCompliance.asp#2–30 (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
98. NFA Interpretive Notice, NFA Compliance Rule 2–30: Customer Information and Risk
Disclosure
(June
1,
1986),
available
at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/
manualInterp.asp#InterpretiveNotices (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
NFA’s enactment of the Rule 2–30 should not be construed to expose Members to
increased potential liability for damages in customer litigation or reparation
proceedings, for several reasons. First, a business conduct standard promulgated by a
self–regulatory organization does not create a private cause of action. Furthermore,
Rule 2–30 is not an antifraud rule.
Id.

99. Id.; see also Andrew M. Pardieck, Kegs, Crude and Commodities Law: On Why It Is Time
to Re-examine the Suitability Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 301, 346 (2007) (discussing the NFA’s historic
opposition to any rules that would impose liability upon futures industry professionals).
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duty to make suitable recommendations and prevent their exposure to
liability in the case of customer litigation.100
Harmonized regulation requires that this discrepancy between securities
and futures rules be solved, and there is little reason to consider a
satisfactory resolution out of reach. A possible solution that one prominent
scholar has proposed would require advisors to use objective measures of
wealth and income to make a blanket determination of whether futures
trading is per se unsuitable for an individual investor.101 This rule is
premised on the notion, currently espoused by both the CFTC and the NFA,
that all futures contracts are risky and that meaningful distinctions cannot
be made amongst them.102 However, although this might be an attractive
rule from an administrative standpoint, it would cut against the
individualized inquiry that is called for under the suitability requirements of
the securities industry,103 maintaining a substantive difference between
securities and futures trading and thereby defeating the purpose of
harmonization.104
Another approach, which the CFTC at one time recommended in a
failed attempt to impose suitability requirements on the futures industry,
would be to make an initial determination of per se suitability, and then a
determination of the suitability of any particular trade.105 The second part of
this test is similar to the securities industry’s highly individualized
suitability requirement, which is helpful for the purposes of harmonization.
But the first part is a blanket determination of the kind just rejected above,
and would again defeat the purpose of harmonization by creating a formal
wall between futures and securities for many customers.
A more reasonable solution would be to simply impose the same
suitability requirements on FCMs as are currently imposed on brokerdealers. Having an identical rule is the best possible outcome for the
purposes of harmonization.106 More importantly, adopting a formal
100. NFA Interpretive Notice, NFA Compliance Rule 2–30: Customer Information and Risk
Disclosure
(June
1,
1986),
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualInterp.asp#
InterpretiveNotices.
101. Pardieck, supra note 99, at 344.
102. Id. at 342–43.
103. See supra note 91.
104. A blanket determination that some customers simply cannot trade in particular instruments
goes far beyond even the most stringent SEC suitability requirements. See JERRY W. MARKHAM,
13 COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION, & OTHER CLAIMS § 10:1 (2008)
(emphasizing the subjective, individual determination required by the SEC rule).
105. See Pardieck, supra note 99, at 343 (citing Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading
Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. at 44,750). Note the evolution of the CFTC’s position: at one time
advocating a two–tiered suitability determination, and at another arguing that suitability is
inappropriate because all futures contracts are risky.
106. Note that FCMs are subject to a suitability requirement similar to that of the SEC when
trading in security–futures products, so they are already familiar with its application. NFA Rule 2–
30(j)(4): Customer Information and Disclosure, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/
manualCompliance.asp#2–30.
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suitability rule will accomplish in form what many think is already
occurring in substance: Administrative law judges and the CFTC have a
habit of searching for “material misrepresentations of risk” when fact
patterns suggest unsuitable recommendations by FCMs.107 Federal courts
have also rendered decisions that appear to mask suitability claims under
the cloak of material misrepresentations of risk.108 Moreover, the arguments
against this kind of formal suitability rule in the futures industry are simply
not very compelling. Although the NFA and CFTC are right to point out
that risk is inherent in all futures contracts, commentators have been quick
to retort that making meaningful distinctions based on factors such as the
structure or size of a transaction is not terribly difficult.109 The CFTC itself
argued as much when it first attempted to impose suitability rules.110
Imposing the securities industry’s suitability rules uniformly across both
industries therefore appears to be a reasonable and relatively simple route
towards harmonization.

C. INVESTMENT ACCOUNT PROTECTION
Securities accounts are protected from the failure of the broker-dealers
who administer them by the Securities Investment Protection Act of 1970
(SIPA).111 That act was a response to the failure of a “significant number of
brokerage firms” in the late 1960s, which saw the assets and investments of
many consumers either lost or frozen as those firms went bankrupt.112 The
Act created the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (SIPC), which
is authorized to appoint a trustee for the purpose of liquidating a brokerage
firm in the event that it is, or will soon be, unable to continue operating.113
In such a proceeding, the SIPC places a high priority on returning to
customers the property they have deposited at the firm,114 and guarantees
customer assets up to $500,000, including up to $100,000 in cash,115 using
funds collected by the SIPC from all member firms.116
Futures accounts do not enjoy parallel protections. Although the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibits FCMs from using one
customer’s funds to maintain margin calls on another customer’s

107. See Pardieck, supra note 99, at 326–30; accord MARKHAM, supra note 104, at § 10:7.
108. E.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 34–36 (Mass. 1986);
accord Crook v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 40, 48–49 (D. Ind. 1983).
109. See Pardieck, supra note 99, at 343.
110. Id. at 343 (quoting the CFTC that “If the professional thought the risk of buying 10
contracts was too great, the proper recommendation might be to purchase fewer contracts.”).
111. Pub. L. No. 598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970).
112. Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975).
113. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78eee (2006).
114. 15 U.S.C.A § 78fff-2(c)(1).
115. 15 U.S.C.A § 78fff-3(a).
116. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78ddd (regarding the establishment of the SIPC fund).
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positions,117 and although customer funds must be segregated from the
FCM’s own funds,118 they may be commingled with the funds of other
customers119 and there is no central insurance system akin to the SIPC to
protect customer assets in the event that an FCM goes under.120 Special
bankruptcy rules require that segregated customer funds, to the extent they
are available, must be paid back to the customer to whom they belong on a
pro rata basis when an FCM goes bankrupt,121 but there is no guarantee that
the available funds will be sufficient to meet those obligations. Those same
rules also direct trustees in a bankruptcy proceeding to transfer customers’
open positions to solvent FCMs with whatever funds are available in the
same pro rata fashion,122 but again there is no guarantee that sufficient funds
will be available to achieve this. The net result of this arrangement is that
“the entire segregated account is at risk when one customer places trades
that he cannot cover and that are too large for the broker to cover either.”123
At no point is any sum of money that has been deposited with an FCM
insured or protected in a manner comparable to the regime provided by the
SIPA.
The CFTC considered such a program in the wake of several highprofile FCM insolvencies during the 1980’s, but ultimately concluded that it
was not cost-effective.124 The NFA concurred in that determination, but
noted that were it to be created, the compensation regime under such a
program would have to focus on facilitating the transfer, rather than
liquidation, of open positions in order to avoid involuntarily exposing
customers to unfavorable market prices.125 This is the same priority
expressed in the FCM bankruptcy provisions,126 and both are rooted in the
concern that FCM bankruptcies should not be allowed to disrupt the market,
harm investor confidence, or interfere with bona fide hedging activities.127
Precisely because of these priorities, SIPA protections should be
extended to cover the cost of transferring open positions in futures
accounts, up to a pre-determined amount. The current ad-hoc process of
determining how much, or how little, money is available on a pro rata basis
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

7 U.S.C.A. § 6d(a)(2) (2007).
7 U.S.C.A. § 6d(a)(2).
Id.
In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 302 (Bankr. N D. Ill. 2000).
17 C.F.R. § 190.08(c) (2007).
17 C.F.R. § 190.06(e)(2). But note that customers do have a right to contact the trustee
and, upon payment of any additional funds required to meet margin, transfer the full balance of
their open positions to a solvent FCM. 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(g)(3).
123. Griffin, 245 B.R. at 301.
124. Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures
Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers From Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE. L. REV.
849, 869–70 (1987).
125. Id. at 870.
126. See supra note 122.
127. Corcoran & Ervin, supra note 124, at 884–85.
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from the insolvent FCM to fund the transfer of customers’ open positions is
simply too complicated and too uncertain to provide adequate protection for
either customers or the marketplace.128 Without guarantees of sufficient
funding, such as those provided by a SIPA-like program, other FCMs may
not be willing to receive open positions from customers of the bankrupt
FCM,129 resulting in considerable losses to everyone involved.130 A
harmonized program would compensate customers for losses in securities in
the manner currently provided for by the SIPA,131 and continue to provide
reliable short-term funding for the transfer of open positions in futures on
an ad-hoc basis, as the FCM bankruptcy rules currently do.132

D. INSIDER TRADING
The Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe.”133 This broad provision is
the basis for Rule 10b-5, which prohibits “engag[ing] in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”134 These provisions ban the practice of insider trading, which
courts have defined as either “trad[ing] in the securities of [a] corporation
on the basis of material, nonpublic information,”135 or “misappropriat[ing]
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty
owed to the source of the information.”136 The former definition, known as
the classical theory, is aimed at “corporate insiders” such as directors,
officers, lawyers, or bankers, and is based on the notion that they have a
fiduciary duty to shareholders of the corporation not to trade for their own

128. See id. at 902–03.
129. Id. at 906–07.
130. Just such a situation occurred when an FCM became insolvent during the 1980’s. See id. at
913.
That case reflected that even full compliance with the Commodity Exchange Act’s
stringent segregation requirements could not assure the firm’s customers against loss
and that once such losses had occurred, no formal governmental or self-regulatory
program was in place to restore such losses. Moreover, the positions of the firm’s
customers were liquidated without any serious attempt to transfer them, reflecting the
current absence of any mechanism to replenish available segregated funds to provide
margin sufficient to permit transfers.
Id.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra notes 115–16.
See supra note 122.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2006).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
Id. at 652.
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personal benefit on the basis of inside information.137 The latter definition,
known as the misappropriation theory, is aimed at “corporate outsiders”
who happen to come across inside information, and it is based on the notion
that their fiduciary duty is to the source of that information, whom they
defraud if they trade on that information without disclosing their
intentions.138 Whether by insider or outsider, the clear intent is to prohibit
traders from profiting off the use of non-public information, as this is an
effective way of “insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”139
The Commodity Exchange Act, by comparison, generally does not
prohibit insider trading. This is largely because one of the basic functions of
the futures markets is to allow hedgers, based on knowledge of their own
positions, to shift the risk of their commodity positions.140 The other basic
function of the futures markets is price discovery, whereby all market
information known to both hedgers and speculators is reflected by the
market price of any given contract.141 Consequently, CEA provisions
against the use of material non-public information target only CFTC
regulatory personnel142 and contract market or futures industry compliance
personnel.143 These persons are prohibited from trading with material nonpublic information,144 and from giving it to others for the purpose of
trading.145 Recipients who know the source of such information are likewise
prohibited from trading with it.146 The concern of the Commodity Exchange
Act, generally speaking, is not so much that traders will profit through the
use of non-public information,147 but that someone involved in market
regulation will use their position to gain unfair access to information about

137. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
138. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654–55 (suggesting that this theory of liability has a rather
significant loophole, however, because “if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—
although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of
loyalty.”).
139. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (2006).
140. Jerry W. Markham, ‘Front-Running’—Insider Trading Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69, 105 n.221 (1988).
141. See Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist and Dir., Office of Econ. Analysis, SEC, Keynote
Address at Wilton Park Conference on Capital Flows and the Safety of Markets: Volatility, Price
Discovery,
and
Markets
(Nov.
10,
2006)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch111006css.htm) (describing generally the price
discovery process).
142. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(c), (d) (2007).
143. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(f)(1)–(2).
144. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(f)(1).
145. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(d)(1), (f)(1).
146. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(d)(2), (f)(2).
147. But see 7 U.S.C.A. § 6j (prohibiting the practice of “dual–trading,” which is a kind of
insider trading performed by FCMs who, upon receipt of a customer order, place their own trade
before that of the customer in such a way as to profit from what is to come).
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“changes in the futures trading environment that might occur through the
exercise of an exchange’s emergency authority.”148
This disparity in insider-trading regulation represents a significant
challenge for the harmonization of securities and futures markets. On the
one hand, research suggests that the strict insider trading regime of the
securities industry has had numerous positive effects on securities markets,
including more informative pricing and greater liquidity.149 On the other
hand, the infusion of heretofore non-public information into the futures
markets, in conjunction with bona fide hedging activities, is considered one
of their fundamental features.150 More concretely, applying the securities
industry prohibition uniformly onto the futures industry would simply be
impracticable, as the rubric of fraud and the duties it implicates in order to
analyze insider trading does not exist in the futures industry.151 It would
likewise be impossible to apply the futures industry’s laissez faire “insider
trading” regime to the securities industry, as it would eviscerate all
protection against the concern that corporate insiders will use non-public
information to trade in the securities of their own corporations to the
disadvantage of outsiders.152
At the outset, a harmonized insider trading rule should not be premised
on the breach of a fiduciary duty, as the concept has no application to the
futures markets153 and is already quite strained when applied to some
securities transactions.154 One potential alternative might be to draw from
the proposal of Professor Jerry Markham, originally aimed only at the
futures industry in response to the stock market crash of 1987, to
distinguish between the use of inside information for bona fide hedging and
the use of inside information for the purpose of gaining an unfair advantage
148. Markham, supra note 140, at 110.
149. Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative
Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 174 (2005).
150. See Markham, supra note 140, at 93–94.
151. Nina Swift Goodman, Trading in Commodity Futures Using Non–Public Information, 73
GEO. L. J. 127, 144–51(1984).
152. Recall that the futures industry only prevents market regulators from trading with certain
material non–public information. Supra notes 142–44.
153. Goodman, supra note 151, at 144–46 (explaining that there are no “insiders” on a futures
contract like there are for a corporation’s stock, and there can be no misappropriation from the
source of information because it does not defraud him to trade with the knowledge he imparts).
154. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin
of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 475–76 (2001) Krawiec illustrates
the absurdity of depending on breaches of fiduciary duty by noting that
defenders of the current system of insider trading regulation have failed to explain why
trading on information overheard in conversations, gleaned from documents in a
briefcase stolen from a stranger, entrusted to a hairdresser by one of her clients or to a
husband by his wife are [not prohibited], while trading on information gained in a tip
from an insider, from information stolen from one’s employer or father, or entrusted to
a physician by his patient are [prohibited].
Id.
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in anticipation of others’ market-moving actions.155 This approach focuses
on preventing unfair advantage, as insider trading prohibitions are meant to
do in the first place.156 This approach would also comport well with the
principles-based regulation that has been so effective for the CFTC,157 as it
would provide the flexibility necessary to distinguish between acceptable
disparities of market information and genuinely unfair practices,158 while
still allowing for bona fide hedging transactions.
E. BROKER-DEALER AND FCM REGISTRATION AND OPERATION
Broker-Dealers make public access to securities markets possible, as
their purpose is to “effect securities transactions, provide investment advice,
take custody of securities and funds, extend credit, and even exercise
investment discretion.”159 Although commonly lumped together by both lay
persons and professionals, “broker” and “dealer” are technically two
different classifications. A “broker” is “any person engaged in the business
of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others,”160 while a
“dealer” is “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”161
Both definitions exclude banks,162 and “dealer” does not encompass a
person who “buys or sells for [their] own account . . . but not as part of a
regular business.”163 Both definitions do, however, include persons who
conduct business solely on the floor of a securities exchange.164 Despite this
technical difference, most firms are both brokers and dealers and there is
virtually no difference in the substantive regulation of the two, particularly
as the determination of who constitutes a broker or dealer is a fact-based
inquiry that involves many factors common to both.165 As a result, they are
commonly referred to jointly as “broker-dealers.”
All broker-dealers, with the exception of those doing purely intrastate
business, are required to register with the SEC.166 Employees of broker-

155. Markham, supra note 140, at 123–24.
156. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (2006).
157. Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Remarks Before the Futures Industry Association, Law and
Compliance Luncheon (Nov. 13, 2007).
158. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (distinguishing between material non–
public information that is gained through skill and research and that which is gained through
misappropriation from an otherwise inside source).
159. David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker–Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899, 899
(1987).
160. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4) (2006).
161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5).
162. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)(B), (5)(C).
163. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5)(B).
164. Lipton, supra note 159, at 905.
165. See generally id. at 908–43 (providing a detailed examination of the various factors that go
into this determination).
166. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(a)(1).
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dealers are considered “registered representatives”167 and do not have to
register with the SEC,168 but they are required to register with the NASD.169
Upon registration, broker-dealers must adhere to a minimum net capital
requirement based on one of two standards:170 Either they may not allow
their aggregate indebtedness to exceed 800% of their net capital, or they
may not allow their net capital to be less than $250,000 or 2% of their
calculated Reserve Requirement, whichever is greater.171
The futures industry’s functional equivalent of the broker-dealer is the
FCM, which is defined as an
individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that is engaged in
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase of any commodity for
future delivery . . . and in connection with such solicitation or acceptance
of orders, accepts any money, securities or property . . . to margin,
guarantee or secure and trades or contracts.172

In addition, the futures industry recognizes “introducing brokers” (IBs),
which are treated like FCMs in almost every respect except that they cannot
accept any “money, securities, or property . . . to margin, guarantee, or
secure any trades or contracts.”173 Every FCM and IB must be registered
with the CFTC.174 In contrast to the employees of broker-dealers, however,
the employees of FCMs or IBs must also register with the CFTC as
“associated persons.”175 Moreover, those who confine their activities to the
trading floor and trade for their own accounts, or for the accounts of others,
are subject to a separate registration regime as either “floor traders” or
“floor brokers.”176 Each FCM must meet certain minimum financial
requirements177 by maintaining net capital in excess of the greater of either
$250,000,178 or 8% of the total risk margin of their customer accounts plus
4% of the total risk margin of their non-customer accounts.179 IBs are
167. Lipton, supra note 159, at 909.
168. But see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(1) (requiring that any person “associated with [a] broker or
dealer” be named on the broker–dealer’s registration. Such associated persons are defined in 15
U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(18) to include partners, managers, officers, and all employees who are not of a
ministerial or clerical capacity).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (2007); accord NASD Rule 1030, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=1189&element_id=115900044
5 (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b2-2.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1) (note that aggregate indebtedness may not exceed 1500% of
net capital during the first 12 months of operation).
172. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(20) (2007).
173. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(23).
174. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6d.
175. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6k(1).
176. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(16)–(17). Note, however, that both are subject to registration. 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 6e.
177. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6f(b).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(A) (2007).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(B).
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subject to less stringent financial requirements, as they must only maintain
a minimum net capital of at least $30,000,180 or may choose to enter into an
agreement with an FCM to guarantee its financial obligations.181
In addition to the initial requirements of registration, both brokerdealers and FCMs182 are continually subject to a wide variety of reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.183 The sheer number of different records
and reports they must perform makes a rigorous examination of all of them
impractical for the purposes of this note, but for both industries they
generally include detailed records of the firm’s finances, precise records of
customer account balances and activities and regular disclosure to both
customer and regulators.184 In addition, broker-dealers and FCMs must keep
detailed records and make reports to regulators with regard to their riskassessment regimes.185 While there are minor differences in the form and
timing of these requirements, they are for the most part very similar. The
most significant difference is the settlement cycle by which customer
accounts reflect changes in positions. FCMs must mark to market their
customers’ accounts on a daily basis,186 whereas broker dealers have three
days to do so.187
Very little imagination is required to harmonize these regulations.
Indeed, they are already quite similar. Combining brokers, dealers and
FCMs into a single entity able to conduct business in both securities and
futures might result in an entity defined as:
Any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that is
engaged in soliciting or in (1) accepting orders for the purchase of any
commodity for future delivery; (2) effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others; or (3) the business of buying and selling securities
for such person’s own account as part of a regular business; and in
connection with such activities, accepts any money, securities or property
to margin, guarantee or secure and trades or contracts.188

180.
181.
182.
183.

17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(iii)(A).
17 C.F.R. § 1.10(j).
Hereinafter, any reference to FCMs also encompasses IBs.
See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(a)(1) (2006); 7 U.S.C.A. § 6g (2007) (authorizing
recordkeeping and reporting for both industries, respectively).
184. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-2-5; §§ 1.10, .18, .31–.37 (regarding securities and
futures, respectively).
185. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17h-1T, -2T; § 1.14-5.
186. 17 C.F.R. § 1.32. This process results in FCMs paying any excess or collecting any
shortfall in their customers’ margin requirements on a daily basis. NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, supra
note 73, at 27–28.
187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1.
188. This is a simple combination of the statutory definitions currently in place for brokers,
dealers, and FCMs. See supra notes 160, 161 and 172 and accompanying text.
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Whether to maintain an alternative classification for IBs,189 and how to
classify professionals whose activities are confined solely to the trading
floor,190 are policy questions that scholars have not yet debated.
Other areas of these regulations could be harmonized in an equally
straightforward manner. Harmonizing the minimum financial requirements
for the combined broker-dealer-FCM entity would require a more rigorous
econometric analysis of their intended purpose than is feasible here, but
given the similarity between current regulations, a minimum of $250,000
appears to be a reasonable starting point for such a discussion.191 Likewise,
the similarity between reporting and record-keeping requirements192 should
make harmonization relatively simple. One point where harmonization will
require genuine change is in settlement periods, which might best be set at a
daily mark to market in order to preserve the integrity it currently provides
for futures contracts,193 and extend that protection to securities.194
V. CONCLUSION
Achieving a harmonized regulatory environment for securities and
futures will not be an easy task,195 but it should be on the agenda of any
policymaker who wishes for the United States’ financial markets to remain
competitive.196 Indeed, as this note goes to press the Treasury Secretary has
just released the Department’s Blueprint for a Modernized Financial

189. There is no analogue to the IB in the securities industry.
190. See supra notes 164 and 176 (Recall that SEC rules require these professionals to be
registered as broker-dealers, while CFTC rules provide them with a separate regulatory
framework).
191. See supra notes 171 and 178 (wherein both broker-dealers and FCMS are currently able to
satisfy minimum financial requirements with $250,000).
192. See supra note 184.
193. Daily mark-to-market settlement, a feature of futures markets, increases liquidity by
allowing traders to realize their gains on a daily basis, and improves market stability by forcing
traders to realize their losses on a daily basis as well. This is in contrast to the three-day settlement
period of securities markets, which forces traders to wait several days before realizing gains, and
may allow losses to accumulate for several days before they must be accounted for. See Securities
Transaction Settlement, Release No. 8398, 2004 WL 482332, at *11 (Mar. 11, 2004).
194. The SEC recently noted that a shorter settlement cycle in the securities markets would
improve their efficiency and reduce their risks. Id. at *12.
Shortening the settlement cycle to T+1, for example, also would synchronize the
settlement of corporate and derivative securities and have liquidity benefits. By
reducing the lag between the settlement of derivatives and government securities and
the settlement of equity and corporate securities, investors that participate in both
markets would be able to reduce their financing costs and obtain the proceeds of their
securities transactions on a timelier basis.
Id.

195. See supra Part II (detailing the failure of the Markets and Trading Reform Act. Note,
however, that it was a relatively un-ambitious regulatory reshuffling, as opposed to wholesale
reform).
196. See DeWaal, supra note 37; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 41.

482

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

Regulatory Structure,197 which in part calls for precisely the kinds of
harmonization detailed here.198 Although the Blueprint has been criticized
in the popular press as nothing more than a “rearrangement of the boxes on
the org chart,”199 in the area of harmonizing securities and futures
regulations it prescribes more than mere bureaucratic reshuffling,200 and has
called for a joint CFTC-SEC task force to examine the matter substantively
and in depth.201 This note’s recommendations should provide a useful
starting point for some of that group’s work.
The Treasury Blueprint is a far more comprehensive and far-ranging
examination of financial regulatory harmonization,202 but the discrete areas
of securities and futures regulation that have been examined in this note are
important pieces of the puzzle. Harmonizing margin requirements at a level
close to that of current futures margins can sufficiently protect markets
from excessive risk and provide much-needed liquidity.203 Identical
suitability rules are a sensible way to protect investors from unscrupulous or
irresponsible advice, regardless of the particular products being
recommended.204 The extension of SIPA-like protections to all accounts
would enhance investor confidence and stabilize the marketplace when a
broker-dealer or FCM goes under.205 A well-crafted insider trading
prohibition that targets only the unfair use of inside information will
provide security and promote fairness across markets, while still allowing
legitimate hedging to proceed.206 And harmonized broker-dealer/FCM
registration requirements will allow market professionals to more
efficiently offer a wide variety of diverse and innovative financial
products.207 All of these are necessary regulatory adjustments that must be
made in order for U.S. markets to remain competitive and stable as
securities and futures continue to converge in the twenty-first century.
Richard Carlucci*

197. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008).
198. Id. at 116.
199. Paul Krugman, The Dilbert Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2008, at A21.
200. See supra Part II (noting the failure of prior attempts to reshuffle bureaucracy).
201. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 197, at 118.
202. See id. at 5–21.
203. See supra Part IV.A.
204. See supra Part IV.B.
205. See supra Part IV.C.
206. See supra Part IV.D.
207. See supra Part IV.E.
* B.A. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. Brooklyn Law School (expected
2009). I would like to thank Professor Stephen J. Obie for suggesting this extraordinarily timely
topic to me, and also for guiding me through the writing process. I also would like to thank Ms.
Tina Gowin, without whose love, support, and encouragement I could not have produced this
note. Hark the Sound.

